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THE APPORTIONMENT OF
"INDIVISIBLE" INJURIES
ROBERT D. ScoTr*
I. "INDIVISIBLE" INJURIES
The human body is a magnificently complex assemblage of
organs, connective tissue and skeletal structure; the study and
treatment of which has given rise to a proliferation of medical
specialties and sub-specialties. Frequently the same organ, sys-
tem or bodily function is subjected to the scrutiny of several
specialists from different fields who lay claim to a high degree
of diagnostic expertise. Despite this specialization, when a bod-
ily dysfunction occurs through trauma or disease, the symp-
toms produced may in many cases defy precise explanation as
to the dysfunction's etiology or source. The problem of discern-
ing the cause of pain is further complicated when the same part
of the body has been subjected to the repeated insults of
trauma and/or disease. The patient himself is often indifferent
to the causation issue unless he contemplates bringing a per-
sonal injury action against one of the causative agents of his
physical problems.
Some conditions having multiple causes seem particularly
resistant to an apportionment, and this may be attributable to
both the nature of the pathology and the mechanics of the
injuries. For instance, an elderly arthritis patient whose af-
flicted neck had progressively worsened for years may know
that a rear-end accident and "whiplash" injury (hyperflex-
ion/hyperextension) had exacerbated his pain, yet the in-
creased amount of discomfort may be exceedingly difficult to
measure to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Similarly,
a patient whose automobile is rear-ended, thus causing an ac-
celerated hyperextension/hyperflexion and further injury when
the patient's head and neck are slammed into a defective head
restraint, confronts the virtual impossibility of apportioning
his injuries between the driver of the other automobile and the
manufacturer of the head restraint.1 Moreover, there are some
* A.B. 1963, Harvard University; J.D. 1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1969,
Georgetown University; partner of the law firm of Frisch, Dudek & Slattery, Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin.
1. E.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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conditions that would seem to defy apportionment-death
being an obvious example.
This sort of multiple cause, indivisible injury case regularly
occurs and the tort system is called upon to provide suitable
compensation for that portion of an individual's pain, suffering
and disability which is attributable to the particular cause
giving rise to the litigation. Indeed, the guiding principle of tort
law by which these damages are calculated is that a de-
fendant's liability should be limited to that portion of the harm
which he has in fact caused, as distinguished from the harm
which has arisen from other causes.'
The Wisconsin system of comparative negligence represents
a fine tuning of this tort principle. In Wisconsin, a defendant's
liability, though joint and several, should ultimately result in
an allocation of damages equivalent to the percentage of the
plaintiff's injuries which the defendant has in fact caused.
Though the Wisconsin equation promotes precision in the dis-
tribution of liability, it has the concomitant effect of making
the plaintiff's burden of proof more difficult. In order to meet
this higher burden, litigants have increasingly relied on expert
testimony.3 In regard to the issues of negligence and causation,
not only is expert testimony desirable, but in many situations
it is required. It is now well established that the price of failing
to adduce required expert testimony on critical issues can be a
directed verdict or a preclusion from submitting a special ver-
dict question to the jury.4 A plaintiff's inability to produce a
medical witness who could apportion his injuries among sepa-
rate causes would seem to jeopardize his recovery even in the
simplest case.
In the past, when two causative wrongs produced succes-
sive, but indivisible injuries, a solution sometimes attempted
was the joining of all wrongdoers in a single tort action. Despite
the fact that this tactic was in defiance of the joinder statutes,
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 315 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
3. See Novakofski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 154, 148 N.W.2d
714 (1967); McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964); Fehrman v.
Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963); Lubner v. Peerless Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d
364, 120 N.W.2d 54 (1963); Kreyer v. Farmer's Coop. Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 117
N.W.2d 646 (1962); Odya v. Quade, 4 Wis. 2d 63, 90 N.W.2d 96 (1958); Globe Steel
Tubes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 495, 29 N.W.2d 510 (1947).
4. See Hargrove v. Peterson, 65 Wis. 2d 118, 221 N.W.2d 875 (1974); Johnson v.
Heintz, 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
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the procedure was justified on the basis that the injury "was
apparently indivisible and unable to be apportioned.
Prior to 1971 several cases reached the Wisconsin Supreme
Court whose resolution turned on how these practical difficul-
ties were to be resolved. Some of these cases arose out of inju-
ries produced by a combination of ordinary negligence and sub-
sequent physician error,5 while another line of cases developed
out of a combination of ordinary negligence committed by sep-
arate tortfeasors.6 In both situations the plaintiffs' practical
difficulties in proving an allocation of what appeared to be
inseparable injuries prompted improper joinders or the allega-
tion of joint liability based on the inseparability of the injuries.
Finally, in Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital,7 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court confronted these issues and ruled against
making any adjustments in the law to accommodate the plain-
tiff's difficulties. In doing so the court adopted the "hardline"
approach expressed in one of the earlier joinder cases to the
effect that the increased potential of the plaintiff's nonrecovery
was insufficient justification for making exceptions to the rules
concerning joinder.8
IX. STATE OF THE LAW PRE-Johnson v. Heintz P
The combination of an injury-producing trauma and a sub-
sequent physician error in the treatment frequently has pro-
vided our tort system with one of the more difficult problems
in apportioning responsibility for an apparently "indivisible"
injury. The first time the Wisconsin Supreme Court defini-
tively reckoned with the problems inherent in this situation
was in Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital."0
Butzow occurred in 1969 when plaintiff Butzow fell and
injured her hip on an icy sidewalk in front of a grocery store
located in Price County, Wisconsin. While hospitalized at the
Wausau Memorial Hospital in Marathon County, plaintiff fell
out of bed twice and reinjured her hip. In a suit to recover for
5. Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268
Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
6. Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968); Caygill
v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
7. 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
8. Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
9. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
10. 51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
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what were alleged to be "inseparable" injuries, plaintiff stated
a cause of action against the parties responsible for the mainte-
nance of the sidewalk" and a cause of action against the Wau-
sau Memorial Hospital. Plaintiff joined these two causes of
action in a single lawsuit in Marathon County.
The venue statutes and section 263.04 of the Wisconsin
Statutes'2 were invoked to force a change of venue to Price
County for the cause of action against the parties responsible
for the maintenance of the sidewalk. When the trial judge or-
dered this change of venue, plaintiff appealed and argued that
the venue statutes were inapplicable to her particular joinder
because all the defendants had joint liability for the totality of
injuries she sustained. She argued that as long as the tortfea-
sors had visited upon her successive traumas which resulted in
a single indivisible injury, the product of their tortious actions
justified the defendants' treatment as joint tortfeasors and
their joinder in a single action.
Chief Justice Hallows authored the majority opinion and
addressed this argument directly. He began by pointing out
that while the parties responsible for the sidewalk might also
be liable for the malpractice of Wausau Memorial Hospital
and, in that sense, there may be a joint liability, this did not
render the two defendants joint tortfeasors. Though there was
co-extensive liability between the original tortfeasor and the
subsequently negligent medical personnel, such liability only
extended to the aggravated damages. The negligent medical
defendant who aggravated the original injury was not liable for
the damage directly caused by the original tortfeasor.' 3
In the course of disposing with plaintiff's argument, the
court was forced to confront its own earlier decisions which
gave every appearance of justifying the concept that noncon-
current tortfeasors were jointly liable for an entire injury where
it was impossible to separate the harm caused by each defen-
dant." Additionally, these decisions had given rise to a stan-
dard jury instruction published by the Wisconsin Board of Cir-
cuit Judges. This instruction was Wisconsin Jury Instructions-
11. The city of Phillips as owner of the building and the Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Company as lessee were joined as defendants.
12. Wis. STAT. § 263.04 (1969) (relating to the uniting of causes of actions).
13. 51 Wis. 2d at 285, 187 N.W.2d at 351.
14. Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268
Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
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Civil Number 1721 which applied to a situation where (a) the
plaintiff sustained damages from both an accident-and medical
malpractice and (b) the plaintiff s injuries could not be divided
or apportioned. In this situation the jury was instructed to
answer the damage question by determining a figure which
would compensate the plaintiff for all the damages sustained
from both the accident and the malpractice.
The idea that a plaintiff could parlay an "indivisible" in-
jury into joint liability for separate, nonconcurrent tortfeasors
had far-reaching importance beyond the typical accident-and-
subsequent-physician-error situation. If the "joint liability" of
the ordinary tortfeasor and negligent physician, implemented
by Jury Instruction Number 1721, was justified by the practical
difficulties the plaintiff had in separating his damages, then
little reason would exist to refuse to apply the same rationale
to an indivisible injury caused by two joint tortfeasors, neither
of whom was a physician.
The answer which came in Butzow was that the inseparabil-
ity of the plaintiff's damages was emphatically unavailable as
a basis for either improper joinder or joint liability. The court
took great pains to distinguish the "joint liability" shared by
an ordinary tortfeasor and a subsequent tortfeasor doctor from
that of the liability shared by ordinary joint tortfeasors. In the
first situation, the original tortfeasor's liability for the conse-
quence of the physician's negligence was said to be based upon
the fact that the additional harm was: One, a part of the origi-
nal injury; two, the natural and probable consequence of the
15. The jury instruction read as follows:
There is evidence in the case that (the plaintiff, (name) -,) (plaintiff's
decedent (name) -) sustained further injury or damages from (an accident
in which defendant, (name) -, was not involved) (malpractice of attending
physician who treated (the plaintiff) (plaintiff's decedent) after the accident in
which the defendant (name) - was involved).
You are instructed that (the injuries to plaintiff are of such a nature) (the
causes of plaintiff's death cannot be separated so) that the damages arising
therefrom cannot be divided or apportioned.
In answering this question, therefore, it is your duty to insert as damages
such sum as will compensate the plaintiff for all of the injuries which were
sustained both from the accident in which the defendant (name) - was
involved, and also from the latter (accident) (treatment of the injuries) in which
defendant (name) - was not involved and (and which resulted in the death
of the plaintiff (name) -__.'s decedent (name)-.
WIs. J.I.-CIIL No. 1721 (This instruction was withdrawn by the Civil Jury Instruc-
tions Committee in 1975).
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tortfeasor's original negligence; or three, the normal incidence
of medical care necessitated by the tortfeasor's original negli-
gence.' 6 Obviously, this rationale did not support joint liability
on the part of the doctor for the total amount of damages suf-
fered by a plaintiff. To the extent that Bolick v. Gallagher"
seemed to support this latter proposition, any such language in
Bolick was specifically withdrawn. 8
Having disposed of the question of whether nonconcurrent
negligent acts could give rise to joint liability on the basis of a
single, indivisible injury, the court turned to the question of
whether such an injury could be the basis for an otherwise
improper joinder. Here too the argument that a plaintiff might
fail to recover anything if he were strapped with the well-nigh
impossible burden of allocating damages to specific causes was
of no avail before the court. In the course of rejecting joinder
based on the supposed inseparability of the plaintiffs dam-
ages, the court acknowledged there might be difficult, but not
insuperable, burdens of proof:
We see no more difficulty in allocating damages to the respec-
tive negligence of two tortfeasors than we do in allocating the
contribution of negligence of two tortfeasors to the injury and
damages. While the problems are not identical, they are simi-
lar. It is quite true in some cases the proof is difficult but the
law does not demand the impossible. This problem was dis-
cussed in Caygill and the hardship recognized but rejected as
the basis for joinder of separate causes of action in violation
of Sec. 263.04.11
The reference to Caygill v. Ipsen" provides an excellent
gauge of the court's true attitude on this issue since that case
contained a complete exposition of the conflicting policy con-
siderations that a multiple but inseparable injuries case pre-
sents. Caygill was a joinder case concerning allegedly
"indivisible" injuries arising out of two automobile accidents
that occurred five months apart and involved two drivers who
were residents of different counties. When plaintiff Caygill at-
tempted to join these two defendants in the same lawsuit, the
16. 22 AM. JUa. 2d Damages § 113, at 165 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 457 (1965).
17. 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955). See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
18. 51 Wis. 2d at 288, 187 N.W.2d at 353.
19. Id. at 290-91, 187 N.W.2d at 354.
20. 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
[Vol. 61:559
"INDIVISIBLE" INJURIES
supreme court dismissed the action against one of the defen-
dants on the basis of misjoinder. The supreme court acknowl-
edged that the decision represented a "harsh rule" since the
plaintiff might well fail to prove either of the defendants liable
in successive lawsuits. The court, however, explained its deci-
sion saying:
In any cause of action where the plaintiff cannot sustain
. . . [his] burden, he is doomed to failure. Damages must
be proved with reasonable certainty . . . . Nor does mere
difficulty of proof exonerate a plaintiff from this bur-
den....
Under our present adversary system, there is always a
possibility that an injured party may go uncompensated.2'
This language from Caygill and the decision in Butzow une-
quivocally rejects the indivisibility of damages rationale as jus-
tifying an otherwise improper joinder or the treatment of con-
secutive wrongdoers as joint tortfeasors. Therefore, it seemed
clear from these cases that, insofar as this rationale was relied
upon in Jury Instruction Number 1721, that instruction was
superceded pro tanto. Despite this clear inference, however,
two years later in Johnson v. Heintz I,22 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found the jury instruction had survived intact.
II. Johnson v. Heintz I
Plaintiff Johnson was a passenger in a car driven by de-
fendant Heintz when their vehicle became involved in two in-
dependent collisions. The first occurred when the Heintz vehi-
cle rear-ended a stalled car on the highway; the second collision
occurred when the stalled vehicle was forced back into the
Heintz auto by an oncoming car. Plaintiff sustained various
injuries and was treated by orthopedic specialists for an injury
to her right knee. Five years later plaintiff sustained additional
injury to the knee which she attributed to the previous automo-
bile accidents. In her suit against Heintz, Johnson impleaded
the driver of the stalled car, Bruhn, and her insurer and the
insurance carrier of the driver of the oncoming auto. At trial
plaintiff was not found to be causally negligent, Heintz was
found eighty-five percent causally negligent and the driver of
the oncoming car, Thomas, was found fifteen percent causally
21. Id. at 589-90, 135 N.W.2d at 290 (citations omitted).
22. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
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negligent.? Upon this finding the court then awarded contribu-
tion to Heintz against the insurer of Thomas' auto for all sums
paid in excess of eighty-five percent of the judgment. It is this
latter aspect of the case that gives rise to the issue central to
this article.
It was the principal contention of Thomas and her insur-
ance carrier that Thomas and Heintz were not joint tortfeasors
but successive wrongdoers, and thus there was no right of con-
tribution despite the apparent indivisibility of plaintiff's inju-
ries.24 In reviewing the facts of this complicated multi-impact
accident, the Wisconsin Supreme Court came to the conclusion
that as to the second impact, Heintz and Thomas were joint
tortfeasors. According to the court, the failure of Heintz to
attempt to free the trapped passengers and prevent subsequent
collisions constituted continuing negligence. Thus, when the
second collision arose, it could be said that factually the negli-
gence of the two defendants concurred in time to produce the
aggravated injuries. It was the continuing negligence of Heintz
and the coalescence of this negligence with the negligence of
Thomas which allowed a finding of joint liability as to the
second collision.?
To the extent that contribution was permitted against
Thomas for injuries which might have arisen from the first
impact, the judgment below was in error. The court noted that
this error was possibly provoked by the trial judge's reliance on
Jury Instruction Number 1721.5 Stating that the instruction
was drawn from cases holding that consecutive wrongdoers
could be treated as joint tortfeasors when their conduct pro-
duced a single indivisible injury,2 the supreme court reiterated
that those cases had been rejected in Butzow. 8
The case was thus remanded for a retrial in order to differ-
23. Bruhn and her insurance carrier reached a settlement with the plaintiff before
trial and thus were neither parties to the-trial nor to the appeal. Id. at 589, 213 N.W.2d
at 88.
24. Id. at 599, 213 N.W.2d at 92.
25. Id. at 601, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
26. Reliance on Jury Instruction Number 1721 was improper because the instruc-
tion involved damages arising from indivisible injuries from nonconcurrent or succes-
sive torts. As explained in the text, the second collision was in fact concurrent. Id. at
602, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
27. Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268
Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
28. 61 Wis. 2d at 602, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
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entiate the injuries that arose from the original impact from
those suffered in the second impact. As to the former, Heintz
alone was answerable in damages, and as to the latter, both
defendants would be considered joint tortfeasors making them
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. Moreover, as joint
tortfeasors in reference to the second accident, contribution
would be appropriate if one defendant assumed a dispropor-
tionate share of the damages. 21
IV. Johnson v. Heintz IF0
Upon the confirmation in Johnson v. Heintz I that an
"indivisible" injury could not give rise to the joint liability of
successive tortfeasors, the prospective burden of proof pre-
sented to the plaintiff must have appeared insuperable. The
problem of determining which portion of the damages was
attributable to each of two automobile accidents occurring
twenty minutes apart was obvious. Plaintiff, however, escaped
this problem by entering into a settlement agreement with the
impleaded insurance carrier of the driver of the oncoming car
before the retrial. Thus, the problem and issue were never ad-
dressed.
The second Heintz trial proceeded to a verdict which in-
quired into the negligence of defendant Heintz and plaintiff as
a cause of the latter's injuries in the first collision. Another
series of questions was submitted concerning the responsibility
of the various parties for Mrs. Johnson's injuries arising out of
the second impact. Plaintiff was found free of negligence in
regard to both accidents.'
When the damages were allotted as between the two colli-
sions, $65,000 was allocated for the first collision; unfortu-
nately, however, the jury did not answer that portion of the
special verdict regarding injuries received in the second colli-
sion. As it turned out, the jury found that though the driver of
the oncoming car was negligent, her negligence was not a cause
of the plaintiff's aggravated injuries. This left only defendant
Heintz as a causative agent, and for this reason, the trial court
in post-trial motions struck the answers to the questions on
causal negligence and removed the comparative negligence
29. Id. at 603, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
30. 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
31. Id. at 291-92, 243 N.W.2d at 821.
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question as to the second collision. 2
Several issues were preserved on appeal, one of which was
the defendant's contention that plaintiff had defaulted on her
burden of proof in that she failed to separate her injuries as
between the two collisions. The supreme court's treatment of
the issue is somewhat confusing. Because of several new con-
cepts expressed in Heintz II, there is reason to believe that the
court is now considering new directions for personal injury
compensation in Wisconsin. On the other hand, the result in
Heintz II is altogether consistent with existing lines of author-
ity and these new concepts may simply have been provoked by
the unusual procedures in the case.
At the second trial, plaintiff made no attempt to prove the
extent to which, if at all, the injuries she suffered were a result
of the second impact. Indeed, plaintiff's motivation to do so
was diminished by the fact that a settlement had already been
procured from the oncoming automobile driver's insurance
carrier and thus only Heintz remained as a target for the dam-
ages sustained in the first accident. At the retrial, it was in the
plaintiff's interest to concentrate all her efforts on Heintz in
order to recover the maximum award. When the retrial resulted
in a verdict attributing all the damages to the first accident,
for which Heintz alone was responsible, Heintz understandably
complained that the plaintiff had unfairly singled her out as
the sole contributing factor to the accident. It was unlikely that
the totality of plaintiff's injuries resulted solely from the first
impact. Therefore, on appeal the defendant argued that plain-
tiff had the burden of establishing a causal nexus between each
injury and its respective impact.
In treating this issue the court followed a two-stage proce-
dure. First, it was conceded that when separate, successive
torts occur and a plaintiff seeks to charge a later actor with the
aggravated or additional injuries, the plaintiff carries the bur-
den of proof to show that he has indeed sustained some dam-
age, in a particular amount, as a direct result of the defendant's
misconduct.3 This was elementary tort law. In essence, the
plaintiff retained a duty to prove that he had been injured by
the particular conduct of the defendant. Though this was es-
poused as the general rule, in the case sub judice, the court
32. Id. at 292, 243 N.W.2d at 821.
33. Id. at 304, 243 N.W.2d at 826-27.
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observed: "The Johnsons here met their burden by presenting
adequate evidence that the injuries of Mrs. Johnson arose from
the multiple impacts and that Mrs. Heintz was negligently
responsible for both of them. 3 4
The second question, as to who had the duty of allocating
the injuries between the multiple impacts, the court resolved
by referring to the party who first raised the issue. In Heintz II
that issue had been raised by the defendant when she im-
pleaded the driver of the oncoming vehicle and made a claim
for contribution. The court saw no reason why the defendant
should not carry the burden of adducing the evidence as to the
allocation of damages. The court explained this distribution of
proof by saying:
The plaintiffs have pledged to satisfy the portion of negli-
gence (and by implication the amount of damages) attributa-
ble to State Farm's insured, but the liability of that insured
existed as an issue at that point only because of the appel-
lant's claim. The original Johnson v. Heintz Case asserted
that an allocation of damages as to the two impacts was
necessary, but the opinion never stated that the responsibil-
ity for this allocatiorl was on the plaintiff. 5
Up to this point the opinion in Heintz II had not changed
the existing Wisconsin case law. Although Heintz ultimately
had to pay the entire amount of damages sustained by John-
son, the "indivisibility" of plaintiffs injuries was not the basis
for this result. Rather, it was the result of the court's decision
to assign the burden of proof for allocating damages to the
defendant. Since the defendant had an opportunity to adduce
proof as to which portion of plaintiff's injuries were attributa-
ble to the first accident, and which attributable to the second,
the defendant was without ground to claim prejudice or error.
Finally, because the jury verdict attributing all of the damages
to the first impact was supported by the evidence, a reversal
of the case would have been improper.
Upon deciding that the burden of proof for allocating dam-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 305, 243 N.W.2d at 827. This solution was consistent with the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(2) (1965):
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his
liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them,
the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
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ages rested with the defendant, Heintz I was essentially re-
solved. It is important to note that these results had been
reached without impinging in any way on the position proposed
in Heintz I that the liabilities of tortfeasors should not be deter-
mined on the grounds that the injuries were indivisible.3 1
The seminal aspects of Heintz II made their way into the
opinion as dictum in response to suggestions made by defense
counsel who proposed that the damages be equally allocated
between the two impacts as a matter of law because of the
difficulty of proof. The supreme court, though not directly re-
sponding with approval or disapproval, did state that there was
authority for the proposition that in multiple impact cases, the
burden of proof should shift to the defendants.37 It was at the
next step in the court's response to the defendant's suggestion
that a creative impulse briefly took hold of the Heintz court.
The concept of the indivisibility of damages was seemingly
resurrected as a means by which a party might be relieved of
an impossible burden of proof in multiple-impact cases. The
court hypothesized that this concept might be implemented by
the use of expert testimony:
Initially there should be some showing that the damages are
indeed impossible of allocation before such rules could even
be considered. There was no expert testimony here by engi-
neers capable of accident reconstruction that would support
the contention that the injuries of Mrs. Johnson were equally
as likely to have occurred in either impact. 8
This portion of the opinion gives rise to a refurbished indi-
visibility theory which, although not recognized in Wisconsin,
has gained some currency in legal thought elsewhere. 9 In es-
sence, the theory proceeds as such:
(1) Some damages from multiple sources should be re-
garded as absolutely resistant to allocation.
(2) A party wishing to establish this is required to adduce
evidence showing that the damages are impossible to allo-
cate.
(3) If the party wants the damages allocated on a pro rata
basis as a matter of law, there should be expert testimony,
36. 61 Wis. 2d at 603, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
37. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 52, at 319.
38. 73 Wis. 2d at 305, 243 N.W.2d at 827.
39. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 52, at 319.
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by engineers capable of accident reconstruction, tending to
show that the damages are as likely to have been caused by
one impact as another.
In other words, if the defendants' suggestion in Heintz H
was adopted as law in Wisconsin, then a party's liability would
turn on proof that the damages were impossible to allocate and
expert testimony to the effect that the damages were as likely
to have been caused by one accident as the other. The difficul-
ties these ideas present to Wisconsin case law is clear. These
ideas lend new respectability to the theory that a party's liabil-
ity might be determined on the basis of the inseparability of
the damages suffered by the plaintiff. This idea, however, was
specifically rejected in Heintz 1.41
In the earlier Wisconsin case law the issue of successive
tortfeasors and inseparability of damages arose in the context
of improper joinder objections. Contrariwise, in Heintz I and
I it was the difficulty in proof which triggered the inseparabil-
ity of damages issue. The dictum in Heintz II which discussed
this concept appeared to outline a sequence of proof by which
the concept might be implemented through the use of expert
testimony. The Wisconsin judges and practitioners encounter-
ing this portion of the decision might sense that the supreme
court is anticipating a change in cases where the damages seem
impossible to allocate. Such a forecast seems supported by the
fact that the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges has already
proposed a new jury instruction which implements the essence
of the Heintz II dictum.
V. WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIvIL NUMBER 1721 REBORN
A committee composed of three Wisconsin circuit court
judges has drafted a modified Jury Instruction Number 1721
which was approved for publication in the following form:
1721-Indivisible Injuries Arising From Nonconcurrent (Suc-
cessive) Torts (Expert Testimony Necessary).
The general rule is that where a person is injured because
of the negligence of another, the negligent party is responsible
only for the damages caused by (his/her) negligence. There is
no dispute in this case that the defendant, (name), was in-
volved in an accident resulting in a claim for damages. There
is evidence in this case, however, that the plaintiff claims to
40. 61 Wis. 2d at 602, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
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have sustained further injuries or damages as a result of an-
other accident (or impact) which did not involve defendant
(name) but which involved the plaintiff and defendant,
(name).
Because there has been uncontroverted expert testimony
to the effect that it is impossible for anyone to divide and
apportion plaintiff's injuries and damages resulting from this
successive accident (impact), you are instructed that in an-
swering question No. - it is your duty to insert as damages
such sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the plain-
tiff for all of the injuries and damages which the plaintiff
sustained from both accidents (impacts).
Comment:
This instruction should only be used where the court has
determined as a matter of law that the defendants are not
joint tortfeasors, that the accidents or impacts are successive,
and there is uncontroverted expert testimony introduced es-
tablishing to a reasonable degree of medical (engineering)
certainty that the plaintiff's injuries are not divisible and
therefore not apportionable. See Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis.
2d 286 at 305.41
This instruction is basically the former Jury Instruction
Number 1721 with the following changes:
(a) The instruction is no longer limited to injuries aris-
ing out of a combination of accidents and medical malprac-
tice and
(b) the necessity of uncontroverted expert testimony
that it is impossible to divide the plaintiff's injuries between
the separate causes.
The proposed instruction retains the concept that all of the
plaintiffs damages from the separate causes are to be included
in the damage portion of the special verdict. In doing so, the
proposed instruction revitalizes the idea that the inseparability
of damages can determine the liability of multiple successive
tortfeasors. In effect, whenever the plaintiff is able to adduce
uncontroverted expert testimony that his damages are impossi-
ble to divide, each causally negligent defendant, regardless of
whether his negligence pertains to the first or second impact,
is liable for the totality of plaintiff's damage.42
41. Wis. J.I.-CivuL No. 1721 (1978).
42. The proposed instruction might be unworkable from the start. Any practitioner
in personal injury cases, either for plaintiffs or defendants, would probably agree that
if the plaintiff could find an expert to testify that the damages are impossible to divide,
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This new instruction cannot be justified by the decision in
Heintz II; furthermore, it directly offends the authorities ex-
pressed in Heintz I. The instruction creates a new breed of joint
tortfeasor, the extent of whose liability is determined by the
nature of plaintiff's injury (an "indivisible" injury) rather than
by the defendant's negligence. It is impossible to base the in-
struction on the decision in Heintz II since that decision was
essentially to sustain the allocation of the plaintiff's damages.
This allocation was approved in the face of arguments by the
defense counsel that consecutive tortfeasors be allotted equal
shares of the liability as a matter of law where damages were
difficult to apportion . 3 The jury's task of making the appor-
tionment had been mandated by Heintz I with the specific
rejection of the idea that consecutive tortfeasors could be
treated as joint tortfeasors because their conduct had produced
an indivisible injury.44
The supreme court's continuing disapproval of the indivisi-
ble injury rationale was recently demonstrated in Voight v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company45 where once again a plain-
tiff alleging only a single injury from multiple causes at-
tempted to justify an improper joinder. Citing Caygill and
Butzow, the court sustained a dismissal of the action on the
basis of improper joinder and reiterated that those cases
"firmly establish that the law of this state does not recognize
any concept of 'joint but successive' tort-feasors."46
The new Jury Instruction Number 1721 stands alone with-
out authority in Wisconsin law and is in contravention of an
uninterrupted line of authority culminating in Heintz I. Al-
the defendant would be able to find one to put that issue into factual controversy.
Therefore, the drafters of jury instructions would have to add another question to the
special verdict by which the jury is asked to inform the court whether, as a matter of
fact, the damages were impossible to separate. However, the addition of more ques-
tions to the special verdict is always to be scrutinized. See generally Decker & Decker,
Special Verdict Formulation in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 201 (1977).
Alternatively, the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges could fall back on Wisconsin
Jury Instructions-Civil Number 1723. This instruction, which is to be used when
there is a conflict in testimony on whether the damages are divisible, leaves that
question up to the jury in deciding whether to lump the damages together or to attempt
an apportionment when answering the damage questions in the special verdict.
43. Appellant's Brief at 28-29, Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815
(1976).
44. 61 Wis. 2d at 602, 213 N.W.2d at 94.
45. 80 Wis. 2d 376, 259 N.W.2d 85 (1977).
46. Id. at 385, 259 N.W.2d at 89.
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though it appears from the dictum in Heintz II that the su-
preme court is beginning to rethink its position on the problems
inherent in the "indivisible" injury situation, it is just as ap-
parent that as of this date the law has not changed. For these
reasons, the new instruction should be withdrawn.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the problem remains
that some injuries from multiple causes give every appearance
of being absolutely inseparable and indivisible. 7 There are a
variety of solutions to the problem which will be discussed
hereinafter. The solution embodied in the resurrected Jury In-
struction Number 1721 represents one of the most radical de-
partures from the current law. It makes a leap from the starting
point that some damages may be impossible to allocate to a
solution which lumps together all the damages in a suit which
the plaintiff has brought against one of the causally negligent
defendants. There are several intermediate solutions, some of
which were alluded to in Heintz II.
Before any discussion of alternatives, however, it should be
emphasized that without a clear directive from the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, little change in the Wisconsin Jury Instruction
can be adopted. The reliance on dictum for standard jury in-
structions seems hazardous and heavy with the risk that future
jury verdicts will occur on the basis of concepts that the su-
preme court may ultimately disclaim.
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO "INDIVISIBLE" INJURIES
If the dictum in Heintz II truly signals that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is now considering how. best to resolve the is-
sues raised by a plaintiff with an "indivisible" injury, there are
several alternatives to evaluate. Any such evaluation should
recognize at the outset that there exists a basic dichotomy in
the schools of thought concerning the nature of bodily injuries.
One school argues that every injury is susceptible to apportion-
ment as to both its causes and extent. The second school argues
that some injuries are of a nature that their apportionment
would only be arbitrary and speculative. Wisconsin aligns itself
47. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 673-74 (1976); Doyle, Multiple
Causes and Apportionment of Damages, 43 DEN. L.J. 490 (1966); Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937); Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and
Severance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L.
REv. 458 (1922); Comment, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision"
Case, 63 VA. L. Rv. 475 (1977); 18 CALIF. L. REV. 630 (1931).
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with the former. In Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital,
Chief Justice Hallows, in the course of disapproving of the
concept of inseparability of damages, which he felt had crept
into Wisconsin law "without notice," very nearly said that
there was no such thing as an "indivisible" injury under Wis-
consin's comparative negligence system." Nevertheless, there
are some commentators who have given much thought to the
problem and who conclude that certain injuries defy any logical
or reasonable apportionment."
What follows is a description of a few of the alternative
solutions to the "indivisible" injury problem and some of the
considerations which bear upon their use.
A. Solutions Which Presuppose That All Injuries Are
Susceptible to Apportionment
A first solution would be the requirement that the plaintiff
prove the extent to which his damages were caused by each
source and do so with expert testimony expressing an opinion
to a reasonable degree of medical or engineering certainty. This
confronts the plaintiff with his most difficult burden of proof
but it is consistent with that principle of tort law which ex-
presses preference for limiting a defendant's liability to that
part of the harm which he has in fact caused. Additionally, this
first alternative is consistent with the theory of reparations for
tortious conduct reflected in Wisconsin Jury Instruc-
tions-Civil Numbers 1715 and 1720. Jury Instruction Number
1720 contemplates a plaintiff with some pre-existing condition,
injury or disability, which is aggravated by the tortious con-
duct giving rise to the lawsuit. The jury is advised that dam-
ages may be awarded only for that portion of the plaintiff's
injuries which represent the aggravation caused by the defend-
ant's actions. Damages for injuries which have resulted, or will
result, from the natural progression of the pre-existing condi-
tion cannot be considered. 5 When this instruction is coupled
with Jury Instruction Number 1715 which deals with the aggra-
vation of a prior injury,51 it seems logical that the plaintiff be
required to put on expert testimony to apportion his injuries
between the two independent causes.
48. 51 Wis. 2d 281, 290-91, 187 N.W.2d 349, 354.
49. E.g., PROSSER, supra note 2, § 52, at 315.
50. Wis. J.I.-CvmL No. 1720.
51. WiS. J.I.-CIIL No. 1715.
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Alternatively, if it is presupposed that all damages are sus-
ceptible of apportionment, then section 433B(2) of the
Restatement of Torts52 would be an appropriate solution. Sec-
tion 433B(2) effects a shift to the defendant of the burden of
proof for apportioning damages between competing causes
where the injury is found to be indivisible. The decision in
Heintz II may be a harbinger of the adoption of Section 433B(2)
in Wisconsin. There, the defendant Heintz, after objecting that
the plaintiff had not carried her burden of proof on the issue
of allocating damages, found herself liable for that burden,
notwithstanding the absence of directions to that effect in
Heintz L The rationale offered in the Restatement for this
"exceptional rule" is the injustice of allowing a tortfeasor who
has caused harm to a plaintiff to escape liability merely be-
cause the plaintiff has an impossible burden of proof in making
an apportionment. The rationale is succinctly summed up: "As
between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused some
harm, and the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship due to
lack of evidence as to extent of the harm caused should fall
upon the former. 5 3
B. Solutions Which Concede That Some Injuries Are
"Indivisible"
If the court is willing to conclude that there are some inju-
ries arising from separate sources which are imposible to appor-
tion between their respective causes and it further believes that
the "indivisibility" of the plaintiffs injuries should not be an
absolute bar to his recovery, then there are other alternatives
available. The first alternative was proposed by the defend-
ant's counsel in Heintz II to the effect that the supreme court
should declare the plaintiff's damages impossible to apportion
as a matter of law and decree a pro rata division of responsibil-
ity among the various tortfeasors who have been shown to have
caused at least a part of the plaintiff's injuries. There is no
direct authority in Wisconsin for such treatment and the un-
derlying rationale for this solution was that it was "much pre-
ferable to a blind rush to the jury, necessitating it to engage in
sheer speculation."5
52. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 433B(2) (1965).
53. Id. § 433B, Comment on subsection (2) at 444.
54. Appellant's Brief at 29, Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815
(1976).
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An alternative to the pro rata treatment would be that em-
bodied in Jury Instruction Number 1721, which as previously
discussed, would impose total liability on all defendants where
it is determined that the injuries are impossible to apportion.
This solution is not justified by Wisconsin precedent and seems
to differ greatly with the threshold principle that seeks to limit
a negligent defendant's liability to that part of the harm which
he has in fact caused.
VII. CONCLUSION
In looking over the alternatives, it is apparent that any
selection will turn ultimately on priorities sought to be vindi-
cated by the judicial or legislative body deciding the issue.
Arriving at a solution to this problem will be no easy task
because there exists a fundamental conflict in the public policy
considerations underlying the issue. As Justice Heffernan in
Caygill v. Ipsen so aptly said:
[A] question of social and judicial policy arises. Stated from
a plaintiffs viewpoint, the problem is said to be whether the
injured plaintiff shall recover nothing because he is unable to
carry the "impossible burden" of proving the respective
shares of harm caused by each tortfeasor, or whether a tort-
feasor may be required to "pay more than his theoretical
share of the damages accruing out of a confused situation
which his wrong has helped to create."
Stated from a defendant's viewpoint, the question is
whether the defendant "will be forced to pay damages for
injuries not shown to have been caused by his own wrongful
act or by the act of another under such circumstances as to
be attributable to him. '55
In Caygill the Wisconsin Supreme Court unequivocally
opted for the latter view, stating that an injured plaintiff
should only recover those damages he is able to prove the de-
fendants negligently caused. In doing so, the court acknowl-
edged the Wigmore position that the escape of a tortfeasor
without payment because of the plaintiff's inability to make an
allocation was an example of the "law's callous dullness to
innocent sufferers. 56
55. 27 Wis. 2d 578, 589, 135 N.W.2d 284, 290 (1965) (quoting Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d
16, 32 (1965)).
56. 27 Wis. 2d at 589, 135 N.W.2d at 290; Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and Sever-
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Despite Wigmore's powerful criticism, the law of this state
has not moved away from the position staked out in Caygill.
Repeated efforts to determine the defendants' liability through
the plaintiff's inability to apportion damages have been re-
jected. This certainly was the teaching of both Butzow and
Heintz I.
Heintz II was an anomaly since, by the time the issue came
to trial, plaintiff was no longer concerned with the necessity for
making an apportionment. The ameliorative effect of plain-
tiff's settlement with the third-party defendant on her burden
of proof may not have been apparent even to her at the time
of the second trial but it gave the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
on appeal, the opportunity to shift that burden of proof for the
apportionment to the tortfeasors for the purposes of determin-
ing contribution.
If there is to be any modification in the plaintiff's burden
of proof in these situations, it is this writer's strong opinion that
the opportunity for some party to make an apportionment be
preserved, no matter how inseparable the injuries appear. Any
other solution involves an arbitrary allocation of responsibility
for the plaintiffs damages and carries with it the great likeli-
hood that the injustice identified in Caygill will materialize:
i.e. that parties will routinely be forced to pay for damages
their actions have not caused. This potential for injustice is
very real in both solutions proposed by Jury Instruction Num-
ber 1721 and the pro rata treatment proposed by the defend-
ants in Heintz II. Additionally, at a time when people are be-
coming increasingly alarmed about their high insurance costs,
these solutions seem certain to promote severe underwriting
problems and increased insurance premiums.
Finally, if there are damages resulting from multiple causes
which are truly impossible to apportion, it seems appropriate
that the decision on inseparability be left open to the parties
for an ad hoc resolution. The difficult countervailing policy
considerations militate against any one fixed solution which
would invariably work undue hardship and injustice in a good
number of situations. The authorities, circumstances and pol-
icy considerations which would bear upon this decision are
beyond the scope of this article. 7
ance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv.
458 (1922).
57. In reference to this problem Dean Prosser is willing to place the entire loss on
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If, however, the court wishes in any way to diminish the
plaintiffs difficult burden of proof in these cases of apportion-
ment, there is a more suitable judicial environment in which
to effect such a change since the passage of the Court Reorgani-
zation Act of 1977." With the adoption of the Reorganization
Act, the court can exercise plenary discretion in granting cer-
tiorari to those cases and issues it wishes to decide. In this
setting the court can accept those cases which provide the most
propitious opportunity for the treatment of critical issues in
Wisconsin case law. In this manner, if an important rule relat-
ing to the plaintiff's burden of proof in a "hard case" is going
to be reconsidered, the court now has the opportunity to select
the case which is the best suited for such reconsideration.
Hopefully, this process will precede any new jury instruction
which attempts to describe the burdens of proof to be borne by
the parties in the apportionment of "indivisible injuries."
a single defendant, no matter how many other causes may have contributed to the
plaintiff's damages. PRossFa, supra note 2, § 52, at 314.
58. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187.
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